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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In November 1938, Walter Westfield, a renowned Jewish art dealer 
in Germany, was arrested, beaten, and imprisoned by the Nazis for an 
alleged violation of currency exchange laws.1  The true purpose of the 
arrest was to seize Westfield’s art collection for private resale, “a typical 
practice of the Nazi government.”2  On December 12 and 13 of the 
following year, a portion of Westfield’s art collection was seized and 
auctioned off through an order of the District Attorney’s Office 
Dusseldorf.3  In 1943, three years after Westfield was fined for the 
alleged violation and later sent to the Auschwitz death camp and 
“exterminated,” the Nazi government sold other works from his art 
collection.4
 
      ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., International 
Politics, 2006, Brandeis University.  The author wishes to thank Professor Harold 
Moore for his invaluable assistance with this Note. 
 
 1. Westfield v. Federal Republic of Germany, No. 3:09-0204, 2009 WL 2356554, 
at *1 (M.D. Tenn. July 28, 2009). 
 2. Id.  See generally Catherine Hickley, Nazi Victim’s Family Sues Germany for 
Looted El Greco, Pissarro, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 26, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com 
/apps/news?pid=20601088&sid=agZqCvEhgE3o&refer=home (“[a]ccording to Jewish 
Claims Conference estimates, about 650,000 art works were plundered by the Nazis . . . 
. Hitler appointed a commission to hunt down old masters for a planned museum . . . 
while Hermann Goering scoured Europe to expand his private collection . . . .”). 
 3. Westfield, 2009 WL 2356554, at *1.  The paintings, which included works from 
El Greco, Pissarro, Peter Paul Rubens, and Anthony Van Dyk, were estimated at tens of 
millions of dollars and were auctioned off while Westfield was murdered in Auschwitz.  
See Hickley, supra note 2. 
 4. Westfield, 2009 WL 2356554, at *1.  Hickley, supra note 2. 
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Nearly seven decades later, Westfield’s nephew Fred brought suit 
seeking recovery of damages from the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
successor to the Nazi government that ruled from 1933 to 1945.5  The 
complaint alleged that the Nazi government engaged in commercial 
activities “by auctioning off in the private marketplace major elements 
of Walter Westfield’s remarkable collection of works of art and 
tapestries, which were destined for the United States.”6  The Plaintiff 
also asserted that this commercial activity had a “direct effect in the 
United States” because, due to the Nazis’ sale, the artwork that was 
intended for transfer by Westfield never reached the United States, 
depriving Westfield’s relatives and the United States art market of his 
property.7
On July 28, 2009, the District Court for the Middle District of 
Tennessee, basing its decision on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(“FSIA”), dismissed the complaint due to lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.
 
8  Subject to certain exceptions (including the “Bernstein 
exception”9 and the “expropriation exception”10
 
 5. Westfield, 2009 WL 2356554, at *1-2.  Hickley, supra note 2. 
 - each of which are 
 6. Westfield, 2009 WL 2356554, at *2.  See generally Hickley, supra note 2 (“The 
Westfield family’s decision to sue Germany for damages is unusual.  In most cases, the 
heirs of Nazi victims have sought the restitution of individual art works.”). 
 7. Westfield, 2009 WL 2356554, at *3. 
 8. Id. at *7. 
 9. See Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 
1947); Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, Modern Status of the Act of State Doctrine, 12 
A.L.R. FED. 707, § 2[b] (1972) (“[T]he Act of State Doctrine is inapplicable where the 
Executive Branch has clearly indicated that it does not object to a court’s examination 
of the validity of a foreign state’s act.”); Frank Walsh, Flipping The Act Of State 
Presumption: Protecting America’s International Investors From Foreign 
Nationalization Programs, 12 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 369, 382-83 (2008) (explaining the 
Bernstein exception was a waiver from the executive that barred the Act of State 
doctrine in a case involving expropriation of the plaintiff’s ship by the Nazis).  The 
plaintiff in the Bernstein cases was Arnold Bernstein, a German Jewish shipping mogul 
who was coerced into transferring his property to the defendants while being held by 
the Nazis from 1937-39.  Although Bernstein’s first case was dismissed on act of state 
grounds, Bernstein sued the transferees of his second shipping line in New York in a 
case which was also dismissed based on reliance on the opinion issued in Bernstein I.  
See Bernstein, 163 F.2d at 246.  These decisions caught the attention of the State 
Department, which then released a letter to the press criticizing these holdings.  
Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of State, Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts Re Suits for Identifiable Prop. Involved 
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outside the scope of this Note), the FSIA grants foreign sovereigns 
immunity from federal and state jurisdiction.11  The FSIA is the only 
jurisdictional basis for suing a foreign state in the United States, unless 
one of certain specified exceptions applies.12 Among the exceptions to 
the jurisdictional bar is the “commercial activity exception” provided in 
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), which was invoked by the plaintiff to bring suit 
in federal court.13
1.  When the plaintiff’s claim is based upon a commercial activity 
carried on in the United States by the foreign state. 
  That section provides three bases on which a plaintiff 
can sue a foreign state: 
2.  When the plaintiff’s claim is based upon an act by the foreign 
state which is performed in the United States in connection with 
commercial activity outside the United States. 
3.  When the plaintiff’s claim is based upon an act by the foreign 
state which is performed outside the United States in connection with 
commercial activity outside the United States and which causes a direct 
effect in the United States (hereinafter referred to as the “direct effects 
prong”).14
The district court in Westfield ultimately dismissed the commercial 
activity exception’s applicability because it found that the Nazi 
 
 
in Nazi Forced Transfers (Apr. 27, 1949)).   After the State Department statement, the 
Second Circuit reversed itself in a per curiam decision and permitted Bernstein to 
recover damages and profits. This intervention has since become known as the 
“Bernstein Exception.” 
 10. The expropriation exception under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3), dismisses sovereign 
immunity where “rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue 
and that property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the United 
States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the 
foreign state . . . .”  Id. 
 11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (2008). 
 12. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 
(1989). 
 13. Westfield, 2009 WL 2356554, at *3. 
 14. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2008) (emphasis added).  The commercial activity 
exception grants jurisdiction in suits against foreign states where plaintiffs’ suit is based 
“upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon 
an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the 
foreign state elsewhere; or  upon an act outside the territory of the United States in 
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere andthat act causes 
a direct effect in the United States . . . .”  Id.  Plaintiffs generally prevail on the 
expropriation exception. 
440 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
government’s actions did not qualify as commercial for purposes of 
FSIA.15  In construing commercial activity, the court noted that the Nazi 
government did not act as a private party within the market, engaging in 
trade and traffic of commerce like private persons, and that the 
expropriation of Westfield’s property constituted sovereign rather than 
commercial activity.16  Because the court concluded that the Plaintiffs 
failed to establish that act was commercial, or that it was “based upon” 
an act by the Defendant in connection with a commercial activity, the 
court did not discuss the direct effects prong of the exception.17
This Note argues that Westfield erred in its narrow application of 
the commercial activity exception to FSIA.  There is sparse precedent on 
how section 1605(a)(2) should apply in Nazi art expropriation cases.
 
18  
Along with the expropriation exception on bases other than commercial 
activity, the Bernstein exception, a special exemption to the Act of State 
Doctrine,19 is the most notable exception to the jurisdictional bar.20
 
 15. Westfield, 2009 Westlaw 2356554, at *7. 
  
 16. Id. at *6. 
 17. Id at *7.  Actions brought under the “based upon” prong of 28 U.S.C. § 
1605(a)(2) can also be brought under the “direct effects” prong.  See H.R. REP. NO. 94-
1487, § 4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6618, 1976 WL 14078 (all 
cases covered by the second clause might also come within the first clause). 
 18. See generally Linda Greenhouse, Justices Take Case on Nazi-Looted Art, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2003, at A20 (discussing the Altmann case and whether it could proceed 
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, noting that the decision “could be 
decisive in resolving a variety of cases involving the behavior of foreign governments 
and their agencies in World War II,” because up until that point, “[t]he federal 
government’s general position [was] that diplomacy, not litigation, should be used to 
resolve disputes growing out of the Holocaust”). 
 19. The Act of State Doctrine is used by courts to limit their authority in matters 
involving foreign governments.  Despite differences in applying this doctrine, the basic 
idea is that United States courts may not inquire into the validity of the laws of other 
governments and their acts performed within their territories See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of 
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697 (1976) (“The major underpinning 
of the act of state doctrine is the policy of foreclosing court adjudications involving the 
legality of acts of foreign states on their own soil that might embarrass the Executive 
Branch of our Government in the conduct of our foreign relations.”). 
 20. Initially intended to permit victims of Nazi war crimes to recover in United 
States courts, the narrow Bernstein exception has been applied only once, and it has 
never been followed successfully.  See First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de 
Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 764 (1972) (“This Court has never had occasion to pass upon the 
so-called Bernstein exception, nor need it do so now.” (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba 
v. Sabbatino,  376 U.S. 398, 420 (1964))).  As a consequence, most Plaintiffs file suit 
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There is also recent case law that construes commercial activity broadly, 
albeit in dicta.  In August 2010, the Ninth Circuit established jurisdiction 
in a Nazi art expropriation case, the centerpiece of which was yet again 
another Pissaro painting, based on the expropriation exception to the 
FSIA.21  Specifically, Judge Rymer intimated that the exception could be 
invoked through broad construction of commercial activity in the United 
States.22
In Cassirer, the plaintiff Claude Cassirer, the grandson of Lilly 
Cassirer Neubar, learned that the particular Pissarro painting
 
23 from his 
family’s collection, which had been confiscated by the Nazis, was 
hanging in the Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation in Madrid.24  
After Cassirer brought suit to recover the painting, the Kingdom of 
Spain and the Foundation moved to dismiss it.25 In affirming the 
California District Court’s denial of the motion, Judge Rymer held that 
the Court had jurisdiction because the expropriation exception was 
applicable (even though neither the Kingdom of Spain nor the 
Foundation took the painting from its owner) because a foreign nation 
may be sued where “any” property was taken in violation of 
international law, not just property taken “by the foreign state being 
sued.”26
Further, Judge Rymer found that the Foundation engaged in 
sufficient commercial activity in the United States to support 
jurisdiction.
 
27
 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(3), which challenges the legality of Nazi Germany’s act.   
  For instance, some of the various activities that could be 
deemed commercial included selling posters and books, licensing 
reproductions, paying United States citizens to write for catalogues, 
sending information to Spain’s tourism offices in the United States, and 
 21. Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 22. See id. at *10. 
 23. The painting was entitled “Rue Saint-Honoré, Afternoon, Rain Effect.”  See id. 
at *2. 
 24. Id.  The painting was stolen from his grandmother through a forced sale for a 
pittance in Germany in 1939, acquired by Baron Hans Heinrich Thyssen-Bornemisza in 
1976, and ultimately bought by the Spanish government and housed in the Villahermosa 
Palace museum.  The museum is operated by a foundation that by law includes several 
government officials on its board.  Appellee’s Brief at 6, Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1019. 
 25. Id. at *1. 
 26. Id. at *9. 
 27. Id. at *10. 
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borrowing and lending art.28
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (“Tribunal”) can be a rich 
source of persuasive and relevant authority on point, as it provides 
courts with a broader array of rulings in deciding expropriation cases 
that fall under FSIA, which can guide courts in establishing a 
jurisdictional basis for cases under section 1605(a)(2).
  Although certain courts such as the Ninth 
Circuit are slowly realizing ways to establish jurisdiction for Nazi art 
expropriation cases in the United States, commercial activity is still 
construed narrowly by many courts, and most courts entirely overlook 
sources of authority that could bolster their rulings. 
29  Courts are 
authorized, and do consider, other bases of law in deciding cases 
concerning Nazi-confiscated art.30
Consideration of this issue is important because an expanded 
definition of the commercial activity exception will determine whether 
plaintiffs bring suit on these claims in United States courts.  Part I 
explores FSIA’s background, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, and the 
background of Nazi art looting cases.  Part II analyzes the conflicting 
  However, this Note will only 
examine how the Tribunal’s cases provide persuasive authority in setting 
a jurisdictional basis under the commercial activity exception of FSIA in 
such cases.  Particular attention will be paid to the direct effects prong 
under 28 U.S.C. 1605 section (a)(2) and the nature of commercial 
activity under 28 U.S.C. section 1603(d). 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. See generally Ministry of Def. & Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran v. Elahi, 546  U. S. 450 (2006) (per curiam) (discussing whether a lien 
on an arbitral award received by Iran’s Ministry of Defense was “at issue” before the 
Claims Tribunal, thus affecting its standing and having an impact on  the definition of 
sovereign immunity); McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F.3d 485 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008) (explaining that despite concurrent motions before the Claims Tribunal and 
the District Court, the Claims Tribunal made judgments on expropriation and FSIA). 
 30. See U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. § 1621-1645o 
(2009); Immunity from Seizure Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2459 (2009) (enacted to prevent 
judicial seizure of artworks loaned to US-based museums).  The Washington and the 
Tereizin Holocaust Era Assets Conferences have also aimed to harmonize the law in 
Nazi art confiscation cases.  In 1998, the State Department convened a conference with 
forty-four other nations to address the recovery of Holocaust-era assets.  Bureau of 
European & Eurasian Affairs, Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated 
Art, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Dec. 3, 1998), http://www.state.gov 
/p/eur/rt/hlcst/122038.htm [hereinafter Washington Conference Proceedings].  
Arguments on just compensation are beyond the scope of this Note. 
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views among United States courts on the scope of the exception, and 
also looks at comparable Tribunal decisions.  Part III calls for a 
resolution of the issue by delving into the legislative history of FSIA, 
arguing that Congress did not intend to have the statute read narrowly.  
Public policy in agreement with this approach is also examined.  This 
Note concludes that Nazi expropriation of art cases will tend to fall 
under the commercial activity exception, and courts should hold 
accordingly. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
This part examines the background behind these legal issues.  Part 
I.A introduces the history behind FSIA.  Part I.B describes the 
jurisprudence and precedential value of the Tribunal.  Part I.C discusses 
the history of Nazi art restitution cases, and the need for persuasive 
authority via the Iran-United States Tribunal. 
A. HISTORY OF FSIA 
The Act of State doctrine, which bars American citizens from suing 
in United States courts foreign governments that expropriate their 
investments, protects foreign governments from liability and denies 
American investors compensation for their losses, under the theory that 
an expropriation decree constitutes an official act of state.31  The FSIA 
also allows foreign states, agencies, and instrumentalities, including the 
Federal Republic of Germany, immunity from suit in American courts 
unless certain exceptions apply.32
 
 31. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 416–17 (discussing the Act of State doctrine in 
finding that an American broker, whose assets in Cuba were nationalized following the 
revolution, could not sue a Cuban corporation); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 
252 (1897); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 658 F.2d 903, 908 
(2d Cir. 1981). 
  The most important exception is the 
“commercial activity” exception, which covers any case “in which rights 
in property taken in violation of international law are in issue and that 
property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the 
United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the 
 32. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2008). 
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United States by the foreign state.”33
The statute defines commercial activity as “either a regular course 
of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act,” 
 
34 
and states that the commercial character of an activity shall be 
determined by reference to “the nature of the course of conduct or 
particular transaction, rather than by reference to its purpose.”35 A 
sovereign’s acts are commercial “if its nature is to carry on trade, traffic, 
business, or profit as opposed to some governmental interest.”36  The 
FSIA is thus a codified version of a “restrictive theory of immunity,” 
under which a sovereign nation may lose its immunity when either the 
State Department or the courts decide that the sovereign’s acts, for 
which the claim arises, are equivalent to private acts.37
For the commercial activity exception to apply in art-looting cases, 
the acts of the German government must be commercial.
 
38  For the 
direct effects prong to apply, the Westfield Plaintiff must establish that 
Nazi government acts outside the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity caused a direct effect in the United States.39
B. IRAN-UNITED STATES TRIBUNAL 
 
The Tribunal was established in 1981 pursuant to the Algiers 
 
 33. Id.  These exceptions fall under a subject matter jurisdiction analysis.  See 
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1983) (holding that a suit by 
an alien against a foreign state for breach of a contract not governed by federal law is 
not within federal judicial power); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES § 455 cmt. c (1987). 
 34. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2005). 
 35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).  See also Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 
504 U.S. 607, 615 (1992) (holding that Argentina’s issuance of the bonds was of a 
commercial character to satisfy FSIA exception of “commercial activity”); Tex. Trading 
& Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 309 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[I]f 
the activity is one in which a private person could engage, it is not entitled to 
immunity.”). 
 36. Kevin Leung, Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran: Putting the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunity Act’s Commercial Activities Exception in Context, 17 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L REV. 701, 708 (1995). 
 37. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711 (1976) (citing 
Letter from Jack B. Take, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Philip B. 
Perlman, Acting Attorney Gen. (May 19, 1952)). 
 38. See generally Westfield, 2009 WL 2356554, at*1. 
 39. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2008). 
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Accords (also called the “General Declaration” or the “Claims 
Settlement Declaration”), which were the product of negotiations 
between the United States and Iran to broker the 1979 hostage crisis.40  
The United States agreed, in exchange for Iran’s release of hostages, to 
unfreeze Iranian assets, nullify any related court proceedings in the 
United States, and reverse any United States court decisions transferring 
frozen Iranian funds to American nationals.41  In addition, the Claims 
Settlement Declaration established the Tribunal to resolve claims by 
United States citizens for compensation of assets nationalized by the 
Iranian government and claims by the two governments against each 
other, through binding third-party arbitration.42
The Tribunal, which held its first meeting in July 1981, currently 
sits in The Hague.
 
43  Nine arbitrators sit on the Tribunal: three of whom 
are appointed by Iran, three appointed by the United States, and the 
other three (third-country) individuals appointed by the six government-
appointed members.44  The Tribunal has received a total of forty-seven 
thousand private claims, and has ordered payments by Iran to United 
States nationals totaling over two and a half billion dollars.45  Currently, 
the Tribunal meets to consider disputes between the two governments.46
Described as “the most consequential arbitral body in history,” the 
Tribunal’s decisions comprise a large body of international case law, are 
recognized for their precedential value in international law and investor-
state claims, and are even considered a “lex mercatoria.”
 
47
 
 40. Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Background 
Information, http://www.iusct.org/background-english.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2009). 
  Furthermore, 
under the Tribunal’s rules, each award must “state the reasons upon 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  As of April 2006, the Tribunal had issued over 800 awards and decisions. 
 Christopher R. Drahozal & Christopher S. Gibson, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
Precedent in Investor-State Arbitration, 23 J. INT’L ARB. 521, 521 (2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=978284# [hereinafter Precedent in 
Investor-State Arbitration]. 
 46. Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, supra note 40. 
 47. Warren Christopher & Richard M. Mosk, The Iranian Hostage Crisis and The 
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal: Implications for International Dispute Resolution and 
Diplomacy, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 165, 171-73 (2007). 
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which the award is based” and “be made available to the public.”48  
These awards offer a rich source of well reasoned holdings for courts 
searching for related precedents.49  Many former Tribunal arbitrators 
now sitting on foreign investment arbitration tribunals spread their ideas 
to new investment disputes they consider.50  Because the Tribunal’s 
decisions are widely available and cover a broad array of commercial 
facts occurring in international business transactions, the Tribunal has 
been able to engage central issues of commercial and public 
international law.51
C. HISTORY OF NAZI ART RESTITUTION CASES 
 
The “greatest displacement of art in human history” occurred 
during World War II, when the Nazis stole hundreds of thousands of 
artworks from museums and private collections throughout Europe.52  
Although restitution efforts were made by the Allied Forces as 
authorized by President Truman, the looted art was returned to the 
countries of origin (not to the individual owner), with the end result that 
many of these paintings were never returned to their rightful owners.53  
Tracking this art was not feasible, based on the sheer number of 
undocumented changes of ownership and black market transactions, and 
the courts’ unwillingness to entertain these claims.54
 
 48. Precedent in Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 45, at 521-22 (quoting Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal, Tribunal Rules of Procedure, arts. 32(3), 32(5), May 3, 
1983, reprinted in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND THE PROCESS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS RESOLUTION (David D. Caron & John R. Crook eds. 2000)). 
  Although Jewish 
plaintiffs argued that the Nuremberg laws were invalid because of the 
racial and religious persecution involved, the first courts avoided this 
 49. Christopher R. Drahozal & Christopher S. Gibson, THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS 
TRIBUNAL AT 25: THE CASES EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW FOR INVESTOR-STATE & 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2-3 (2007). 
 50. M. Sornarajah, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 351(1994). 
 51. Precedent in Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 45, at 522.  The importance 
of Tribunal precedent is evident, where nearly forty-five percent of ICSID awards 
reaching the merits cite Tribunal precedent.  Id. at 540. 
 52. Michael J. Bazyler, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN 
AMERICA’S COURTS 202 (2003). 
 53. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 578 F.3d 1016, 1023-
24 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 54. Id. at 1019. 
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point and upheld Nazi confiscations based on the early formulation of 
the act of state doctrine, based on the idea that “all foreign law must be 
recognized here.”55 Further, the United States’ restitution policy ended 
in 1948, after which authorities refused to accept any more claims.56
Recently, many prominent museums discovered their collections 
include Nazi-looted art; the restitution of such artwork to their prior 
owners has been the cause of much controversy in the past decade.
 
57
The Holocaust Era Assets Conference, held in Prague during June 
26-30, 2009, focused on recent developments in the area of the recovery 
of looted art since the 1998 Washington Conference on Holocaust Era 
Assets and examined the amount of work that remains.
 
58
 
 55. Lucy Dunn Schwallie, Acts of Theft and Concealment: Arguments Against the 
Application of the Act of State Doctrine in Cases of Nazi-Looted Art, 11 UCLA J. INT’L 
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 281, 288-89 (2006) (quoting Eugene F. Mooney, FOREIGN 
SEIZURES: SABBATINO AND THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE 69 (1967)). 
  Because 
 56. Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1024. 
 57. Id. at 1027. See also Kwame Opoku, The Quest of Reclaiming Stolen Cultural 
Objects from Western Countries, VANGUARD (Nig.), Sept. 21, 2008, available at 2008 
WLNR 18004164 (discussing the debate surrounding Western countries’ unwillingness 
to return stolen artifacts belonging to African countries, the issue of restitution of the 
stolen Benin bronzes, and how these artifacts can be recovered from Western 
countries); Suzanne Muchnic, At the Getty, A Cache With Cachet: Works By Gauguin, 
Claude, Beato And Hawkinson Will Be Going Up At The Museum Within Months, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2007, at E1, available at 2007 WLNR 18695396; Richard Brooks, 
National Gallery Admits that Masterwork May Be Nazi Loot, SUNDAY TIMES (U.K.), 
Nov. 26, 2006, at 11, available at 2006 WLNR 20455927 (noting that the National 
Gallery has admitted that a Renaissance masterpiece in its collection may have been 
looted by the Nazis from a Jewish family). 
 58. See HOLOCAUST ERA ASSETS CONFERENCE, http://www.holocausteraassets.eu/ 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2009).  Proposed changes include establishing national claims 
procedures for fair and just solutions encompassing decisions based on the merits.  See 
also Washington Conference Proceedings, supra note 30.  On October 18, 2010, the 
Associated Press reported on the debut of a new database built out of Nazi records that 
will help trace works of art looted during World War 2. The database, a joint project of 
the New York-based Conference of Jewish Material Claims Against Germany and the 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., provides free access 
for Holocaust survivors, their relatives, and art collectors and museums, to search the 
online database of more than 20,000 art objects stolen in Germany-occupied France and 
Belgium from 1940 to 1944.  New online resource debuts for Nazi-era looted art, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 21, 2010, available at http://topnews360.tmcnet.com/topics/ 
associated-press/articles/2010/10/21/110283-new-online-resource-debuts-nazi-era-
looted-art.htm. 
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restitution cases usually involve foreign-owned museums, which often 
necessitate litigating complicated issues regarding foreign immunity, 
courts have been slower to recognize and take into account proposed 
changes for handling such claims.59  Although the Bernstein exception 
provides relief for certain suits barred under FSIA, the precedential 
value of this exception is limited since, to date, the Supreme Court has 
refused to pass on the validity of the exception.60 Thus, because victims 
of looted art are not covered by any restitution program, only a handful 
of lawsuits have been filed to recover looted artwork to date.61
The seminal case regarding FSIA in the Nazi art restitution context 
is Republic of Austria v. Altmann,
 
62 a case brought by Altmann against 
Austria and an Austrian gallery to recover Nazi-stolen paintings under 
FSIA’s commercial activity exception.63  Because the events giving rise 
to Ms. Altmann’s claim took place before FSIA was enacted in 1976, the 
key issue was whether FSIA applies retroactively, allowing the court to 
establish jurisdiction.64 The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction should 
be upheld where FSIA does not affect any substantive law determining 
the liability of a foreign state or instrumentality, regardless of when the 
cause of action accrued.65  The Court also noted in a concurring opinion 
that the nature of the gallery’s actions was sufficiently commercial to 
fall under (a)(3)’s commercial activity exception.66
Altmann was not decided under the direct effects prong, so little 
 
 
 59. See Benjamin E. Pollock, Out of the Night and Fog: Permitting Litigation to 
Prompt an International Resolution to Nazi-Looted Art Claims, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 193, 
213-28 (2006). 
 60. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 419-20 (1964) (“[T]he Court refrained from ruling 
on the status of the Bernstein exception.”); see also Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. 
Provisional Military Gov’t of Socialist Eth., 729 F.2d 422, 424 (6th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he 
exception may have doubtful utility since a majority of the Court did not approve its 
use.”). 
 61. Michael J. Bazyler & Amber L. Fitzgerald, Trading With the Enemy: Holocaust 
Restitution, the United States Government, and American Industry, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L 
L. 683, 709 (2003). 
 62. 541 U.S. 677 (2004). 
 63. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2008).  For purposes of this Note, commercial activity 
in this section will be interchangeable with commercial activity in (a)(3).  See supra 
note 11. 
 64. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 686-87. 
 65. Id. at 699. 
 66. Id. at 707 (Breyer & Souter, JJ., concurring). 
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guidance on its applicability may be gleaned from this holding.67  
Therefore, a need exists to clarify the commercial activity exception, 
paying particular attention to the direct effects prong and what 
constitutes commercial activity.  Relevant persuasive authority via the 
Tribunal may assist courts in doing so.68
 
 
II. WHETHER COURTS SHOULD INTERPRET THE COMMERCIAL 
ACTIVITY EXCEPTION TO FIND FEDERAL JURISDICTION APPLIES TO 
NAZI ART-LOOTING CASES 
This part discusses whether the commercial activity exception of 
FSIA, in particular the direct effects prong, should be construed broadly 
or narrowly in establishing federal jurisdiction.  Parts II.A and II.A.1 
examine the relevant circuit court decisions that read the direct effects 
prong narrowly.  Part II.B analyzes opinions that hold the opposite to 
establish jurisdiction under FSIA.  Part II.C analyzes Tribunal decisions 
involving FSIA.  For purposes of this Note, differences between real and 
personal property are irrelevant, as there is sparse precedent in Nazi art 
expropriation cases.  This distinction is also addressed in Part III.69
A. CONSTRUING AGAINST NAZI ART EXPROPRIATION  
AS A COMMERCIAL ACT 
 
Within the confines of expropriation claims, the Eleventh Circuit’s 
current approach is to treat confiscation of real property as a sovereign 
act when the property is put to military use.70  Beg involved a Pakistani 
plaintiff who filed suit against the Government of Pakistan when his ten 
million dollar Punjab land was expropriated by the government and 
subsequently used for military housing and transferred to members of 
the military.71
 
 67. Id. at 700-04 (majority opinion). 
  One of the issues was whether the Pakistani 
government’s expropriation of property fell under the commercial 
 68. See supra Parts I.A-B. 
 69. See infra Part III.A. 
 70. Beg v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 353 F.3d 1323, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(“[The] Pakistani government’s actions involve the power of eminent domain and, 
therefore, are not commercial. The power of eminent domain is a sovereign power.”). 
 71. Id. at 1324. 
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activity exception to FSIA. The Court explained that “confiscation of 
real property is a public act because private actors are not allowed to 
engage in ‘takings.’”72  The court’s reasoning lay in the nature of 
eminent domain, which is an activity that private actors are not allowed 
to conduct.73
The Second Circuit has held that regardless of the subsequent 
commercial treatment of expropriated property by the defendants, 
expropriation is a “decidedly sovereign—rather than commercial—
activity.”
 
74  In Garb, Jewish persons who owned real property in Poland 
during the Second World War brought suit against the Republic of 
Poland seeking redress for the expropriation of real property from Jews 
in post-war Poland.75  In determining whether this expropriation fell 
under the commercial activity exception, the Second Circuit first 
identified the nature of the Defendant’s acts that formed the basis of the 
suit.  It determined that because the Plaintiffs’ claims were based upon 
an act of expropriation that was not “in connection with a commercial 
activity of a foreign state,” then regardless of the subsequent treatment 
of the expropriated property, Plaintiffs’ claims lacked the jurisdictional 
nexus.76  In a case with substantially similar facts, the Seventh Circuit 
has agreed with this approach.77
 
 
1. Narrow Interpretation of Direct Effects Prong 
 
The Fifth Circuit construes the direct effects prong of the exception 
very narrowly, by requiring a substantial and foreseeable jurisdictional 
nexus with the United States.78
 
 72. Id. at 1326. 
  In Soudavar, where shareholders of a 
 73. 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 2 (2009) (defining eminent domain as “the 
inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately owned property and convert it 
to public use”). 
 74. Garb v. Republic of Poland, 440 F.3d 579, 582 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 587; see also Shakour v. Federal Republic of Germany, 199 F. Supp. 2d 
8, 13 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that Germany’s expropriation of three factories was not 
commercial because private actors cannot engage in a taking). 
 77. Haven v. Polska, 215 F.3d 727, 736 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding commercial 
activity exception inapplicable where Jewish plaintiff claimed that the Polish 
government illegally seized their property after World War II because these acts were 
not “based upon” a commercial activity). 
 78. Soudavar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 186 F.3d 671, 674 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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corporation expropriated by the Iranian government sued Iran and two of 
its departments, the Fifth Circuit held that the Iranian government’s 
expropriation, whether sovereign or commercial, did not fall within the 
commercial activity exception.79  The exception did not apply even 
where Iran’s refusal to pay for the expropriated shares caused direct 
effects in the United States in the form of lost income and lost tax 
revenue.80  The analysis did not alter even though the shareholders later 
became American residents because, according to the Court, the 
requisite direct effect in the United States was lacking.81
The Fifth Circuit’s strict direct effects analysis was reiterated by the 
Second Circuit in Garb.
 
82  Not only did the court hold that the Polish 
government’s post-World War II expropriation of its citizens’ real and 
personal property was not a commercial activity, but the court also 
found that it did not have a direct effect in the United States, to fall 
within the commercial activity exception to immunity.83  Even though 
the expropriation had resulted in financial loss to United States 
residents, the property had been advertised for sale in the United States, 
and American financial institutions had maintained the property,84 the 
court held that the effects of the actions in the United States were still 
too “attenuated” to satisfy §1605(a)(2).85  The Eleventh Circuit has 
adopted this strict construction as well.86
B. CONSTRUING NAZI ART EXPROPRIATION AS A COMMERCIAL ACT 
 
Although Congress did not specify whether expropriations fall 
neatly into a commercial activity category, the Ninth Circuit has held 
that a commercial activity exists if a private person can engage in that 
very activity.87
 
 79. Id. 
  In Siderman de Blake, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Garb v. Republic of Poland, 440 F.3d 579, 587 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Garb v. Republic of Poland, 207 F. Supp. 2d 16, 32 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 85. Garb, 440 F.3d at 587. 
 86. Harris Corp. v. Nat’l Iranian Radio and Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1351 (11th 
Cir. 1982) (analyzing FSIA’s direct effects prong under a foreseeability standard and 
observing that the defendant’s commercial activity had “significant, foreseeable 
financial consequences” in the United States). 
 87. See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 708-09 (9th 
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Argentinian government had expropriated a hotel from the Siderman 
family and tortured Jose Siderman, an Argentinian national, because the 
family was Jewish.88  At issue was whether the relevant activity was 
sovereign or commercial.89  The Ninth Circuit characterized Argentina’s 
management of the hotel as the type of activity in which a private party 
might engage and thus held it was a commercial activity under FSIA.90  
In so holding, Siderman established that when a foreign government 
generated revenue from its expropriation, paid for advertising in the 
United States, and accepted payments for reservations in the United 
States, this expropriation was a commercial activity carried on in the 
United States in connection with commercial activity of the foreign 
state.91  The Ninth Circuit focused on what the government did with 
property after the expropriation, not whether the government was acting 
like a private person in the marketplace at the time of the 
expropriation.92
The Ninth Circuit has stated that § 1605 is silent on what 
constitutes commercial activity that is either a “regular course of 
commercial conduct” or a “particular commercial transaction or act,” 
and has left it to the courts to “flesh out on a case-by-case basis.”
  Thus, the court declined from ruling whether 
expropriation was a sovereign act; rather, it was the subsequent 
disposition of the property that determined whether the exception 
applied. 
93  In 
Cassirer, one of the bases the Court cited in establishing jurisdiction was 
a broad view of commercial activity, such as the Foundation’s many 
contacts with the United States, which resulted in encouraging 
Americans to visit the museum where the Pissarro was featured.94
 
Cir. 1992) (quoting Joseph v. Office of the Consulate Gen. of Nig., 830 F.2d 1018, 
1024 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also Tex. Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 310 (2d Cir. 1981) (refusing to grant immunity where the 
Nigerian government was sued for breaching a contract to purchase cement because a 
private person can engage in this activity). 
  
Further, the Foundation engaged in “somewhat more [commercial] 
activity in the United States than sufficed in Siderman and somewhat 
 88. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 703. 
 89. Id. at 708. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 710. 
 92. Id. at 708-10. 
 93. Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1033. 
 94. Id. 
2011] JURISDICTION IN  453 
NAZI ART EXPROPRIATION CASES 
less than occurred in Altmann,” and thus its endeavors arose to the level 
of commerce for jurisdictional purposes under § 1605(a)(3).95
The D.C. Circuit has also expressed this expansive view of the 
nature of a commercial activity.
 
96  It has clarified that if the expropriated 
property at issue is owned or operated by an agency of the foreign 
sovereign and that agency is “engaged in” commercial activity in the 
United States, then sovereign immunity does not apply.97  In Agudas 
Chasidei, American plaintiffs filed suit against the Russian Federation to 
regain possession of a religious library and archive that allegedly had 
been unlawfully taken through various means beginning with the 
Bolshevik government in 1917.98  The relevant inquiry was not whether 
expropriation was a sovereign or commercial act, but whether 
subsequent actions by the government were commercial activity.99  The 
court dismissed the claims with respect to the library (finding  
immunity) but not as to the archive, because the various Russian 
governmental agencies engaged in commercial contracts for publications 
in the United States.100 The nature of the activity was based on the low 
threshold of the government’s engagement in commercial activity in the 
United States. 101
1. Broad Interpretation of Direct Effects Prong 
 
The legal debate over the direct effects prong is similarly 
convoluted, as circuit courts have differed on the correct application of 
the prong.102
 
 95. Id. at 1034. 
  The Supreme Court has established an expansive 
 96. See Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Federation, 528 F.3d 934 
(D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 97. Id. at 946. 
 98. Id. at 938. 
 99. Id. at 946-48. 
 100. Id. at 946-48, 955. 
 101. Id.at 946-48.  Another view that has been expressed is that the purpose should 
be considered only as far as is necessary to define the nature of the act in question.  See 
Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain, 835 F.2d 160, 163 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 102. Some federal courts combine “minimum contacts” due process analysis with 
the direct effects exception.  See, e.g., Exch. Nat’l Bank v. Empresa Minera del Centro 
del Peru, 595 F. Supp. 502, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding no subject matter jurisdiction 
because defendant state lacked minimum contacts).  Other courts adhere to a more 
rigorous personal jurisdiction analysis, which requires “a due process scrutiny of the 
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interpretation of the “direct effects” requirement in Weltover, by noting 
that the direct effects prong need only “follow as an immediate 
consequence” of the defendant’s activity.103  In Weltover, bond holders 
brought a breach of contract action against Argentina and its central 
bank, as a result of Argentina’s unilateral grant of extension for payment 
on government-issued bonds.104  Although several lower courts had 
previously held that the direct effects prong required the acts to be 
“substantial,” “direct,” and “foreseeable,” Justice Scalia dismissed these 
unexpressed requirements.105  In holding that unilateral rescheduling of 
the bond payments had a “direct effect” in the United States, Scalia 
expounded the legislative intent behind the “direct effects” prong.106  
Scalia described a House Report, which stated that conduct under the 
direct effects prong would be subject to the Third Restatement on 
Foreign Relations, which in turn stated that American laws would not be 
given extraterritorial application unless the conduct had a “foreseeable 
result” and a “substantial effect within the United States,” as a “non 
sequitur.”107  In the current case, the plaintiffs had designated their 
accounts in New York as the place of payment, and Argentina made 
interest payments into those accounts before rescheduling the 
payments.108 The Court concluded that since New York was the place of 
performance for Argentina’s contractual obligations, and because money 
that was supposed to have been delivered to a New York bank for 
deposit was not forthcoming, rescheduling those obligations had a 
“direct effect” in the United States.109
Weltover approved the Second Circuit’s express rejection of the 
Restatement’s interpretation of direct effects.
 
110
 
court’s power to exercise its authority over a particular defendant.”  Tex. Trading & 
Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 1981). 
  In Texas Trading, the 
Second Circuit explained that the reference was a misconception 
 103. Weltover, 504 U.S. at  618. 
 104. Id. at 609. 
 105. Id. at 618. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 618-19. 
 108. Id. at 619. 
 109. Id. at 619-20.  In so holding, the Court adopted the restrictive theory of foreign 
sovereign immunity, reasoning that it reflected Congress’ understanding of sovereign 
immunity. 
 110. Tex. Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 
311 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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because the Restatement “concerns the extent to which substantive 
American law may be applied to conduct overseas, not the proper 
extraterritorial jurisdictional reach of American courts.”111  In Texas 
Trading, four New York corporations brought two separate actions 
against Nigeria and the Central Bank of Nigeria, one for a breach of 
contract and the other for a breach of letters of credit, under the 
jurisdictional bases of FSIA.112  The district court dismissed one action 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and allowed the other.113  On 
appeal, the Second Circuit found that the alleged actions under both 
counts constituted commercial acts causing a direct effect under FSIA, 
and thus Nigeria was not entitled to immunity from the jurisdiction of 
United States courts.114  In construing the direct effects prong broadly to 
establish jurisdiction, the court looked to Congressional intent behind 
FSIA.115  Although the contract breaches took place in part outside the 
United States, the Court reasoned that the “FSIA did not intend to 
incorporate into modern law every ancient sophistry concerning ‘where’ 
an act or omission occurs.”116
This broad construction of the direct effects prong translates into 
expropriation cases as well as contract claims.
  Thus, rules placing commercial conduct 
squarely within one jurisdiction are outdated in today’s globalized 
society, especially since commerce can take place in several 
jurisdictions with the aid of email, faxes, and electronic exchange of 
currency. 
117
 
 111. Id.; see also Dynda L. Artz, The Noncorporate Plaintiff: Hostage to the 
Gordian Knot of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 907, 
929 (1986) (explaining that because § 18 refers to application of U.S. law overseas, it 
“does not help determine whether an act causes a direct effect in the United States”). 
  The Ninth Circuit has 
 112. Tex. Trading, 647 F.2d at 302. 
 113. Id. at 308. 
 114. Id. at 316. 
 115. See id. at 311 (citation omitted) (“[u]nder section 1605(a)(2), no act of a 
foreign state, tortious or not, which is connected with the commercial activities of a 
foreign state would give rise to immunity if the act takes place in the United States or 
has a direct effect within the United States.”). 
 116. Id. at 311 n.30.  The Court further noted that “[c]onduct crucial to modern 
commerce telephone calls, telexes, electronic transfers of intangible debits and credits 
can take place in several jurisdictions.”  Id. 
 117. See Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S., 528 F.3d at 947-48. 
 (although not following the “immediate consequences” test, using a similarly broad 
“engaged in” test to hold that where the expropriated property is owned or operated by 
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followed this interpretation of direct effects by holding that an 
expropriation by the Argentinean government could fall within the third 
clause of the commercial activity exception because the government 
continued to operate the plaintiff’s hotel for profit after the seizure.118  
Although the Siderman holding was issued prior to Weltover, Weltover 
clarified (without delving into the direct effects prong) that in 
determining whether a government activity is commercial, the court is to 
consider the nature of the act, which is separate from the analysis of 
whether the effects of the defendants’ act has immediate 
consequences.119
C. TRIBUNAL’S STATEMENTS ON FSIA 
 
The Tribunal’s take on the direct effects prong can be traced 
through a case later analyzed by the D.C. Circuit.120  In Foremost 
McKesson, the plaintiff Foremost McKesson and its wholly owned 
subsidiaries (“Foremost”) alleged that Iran had illegally divested 
Foremost of its investments in an Iranian dairy company.121  The 
Tribunal held that the flow of capital, management, technology, and 
goods from Iran to the United States was sufficient to establish the 
“foreseeable, substantial, and direct” effect in the United States.122  
Although Iran argued that Weltover changed the result of the Tribunal’s 
analysis, and that the direct effects prong need not require a 
“foreseeable” or “substantial” effect, the court still held that a 
commercial activity exception under Weltover was applicable, a holding 
affirmed by the D.C. Circuit.123
 
an agency or instrumentality of the foreign sovereign that is “engaged in” commercial 
activity in the U.S., sovereign immunity does not apply). 
  The Tribunal seemed to be advocating a 
narrower reading of the exception through the Restatement.  However, 
by later analyzing the case under Weltover, the Tribunal appeared to 
move towards endorsing Weltover as well as the restrictive theory of 
 118. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 708, 713. 
 119. Weltover, 504 U.S. at  617-18. 
 120. Foremost McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 
1990); see also 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 228 (1985). 
 121. Foremost McKesson, 905 F.2d at 439. 
 122. Id. at 451. 
 123. Id. at 449. 
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sovereign immunity.124
The Tribunal’s willingness to find exceptions to FSIA is evidenced 
in its statements relating to sovereign immunity in Islamic Republic of 
Iran v. United States.
 
125 At issue was whether the United States violated 
its obligations under the Algiers Declaration by failing to transfer to Iran 
all Iranian tangible properties subject to United States jurisdiction.126  
Iran also sought compensation for any damages arising from the 
blocking of its properties from 1979 until 1981.127  The Tribunal found 
the United States liable for breaching its obligations under the Algiers 
Declarations, but reserved judgment as to the nature or amount of the 
damages Iran incurred.128  In support of its holding of a partial award, 
the Tribunal invoked the issue of sovereign immunity.  It also noted that 
the United States had no obligation to transfer to Iran the properties in 
which Iran had only a “partial or contingent interest.”129  The Tribunal 
spoke prudently on the issue, and reiterated that FSIA was only a 
“restrictive theory of immunity,” highlighting that a sovereign’s powers 
from being sued were not absolute.130  The Tribunal interwove various 
international law precedents to bolster its stance that FSIA is subject to 
significant exceptions, one of which expressly excludes states’ sovereign 
immunity when they engage in commercial transactions.131
The Tribunal found support for this restrictive theory in Article 10 
of the Articles of the United Nations International Law Commission, 
which states in pertinent part that a  “[s]tate cannot invoke immunity 
from [a certain] jurisdiction in a proceeding arising out of [a] 
 
 
 124. Id; see supra note 107. 
 125. Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. A15 II:A & II:B, Award 
No. 529-A15-FT, 28 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 112, 1992 WL 928957 (May 6, 1992). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. ¶ 77. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. § B. “Prudence dictates that the Tribunal should not act in a vacuum, but 
should refrain from pronouncements concerning any possible immunity of Iranian 
property until the transactions underlying Iran’s property claims can be examined.”  Id. 
Such statements should give comfort to judges looking for persuasive authority that the 
Tribunal’s decision-making process was thorough and cautious. 
 131. Id. ¶ 52 (acknowledging that the properties at issue here may not be “covered 
by said customary international law immunity” (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 
(2008))). 
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commercial transaction.”132 A commercial transaction is defined as “any 
commercial contract or transaction for the sale of goods or supply of 
services” as well as “any other contract or transaction of a commercial, 
industrial, trading or professional nature . . . .”133  The Tribunal then 
expounded this restrictive theory of immunity as reflected in the judicial 
practices of a wide array of nations, including Argentina, Austria, 
Belgium, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Pakistan, and 
the United Kingdom.134 In listing jurisdictions that practice this 
restrictive theory, the Tribunal cited FSIA’s purpose as a balance 
between international commercial interests and principles of 
international comity, noting that immunity should only apply in a 
limited set of circumstances.135
 
 
 III. RESOLUTION 
Part II of this note reviewed the current split on the issue of how 
courts establish federal jurisdiction over claims against foreign 
governments. Part III advocates for resolution of this conflict through a 
broad reading of the commercial activity exception or an expansion of 
the direct effects prong. Part III.A applies the above analysis to 
Westfield and similar cases. Part III.B maintains that original legislative 
intent provides persuasive evidence that courts should comply with an 
expansive version of the commercial activity exception. Part III.C 
discusses public policy reasons in favor of a broader application of FSIA 
in Nazi art expropriation cases. 
 
 
 132. Id. § B (citing U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and their Property, art. 10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.462/Add.1 (June 
11, 1991) [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles]. 
 133. Id. (citing ILC Draft Articles, art. 2). 
 134. Id. (citing ILC Draft Articles, arts. 14-22); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 451, n.1 (“[L]eading groups of 
international lawyers, such as the Institute of International Law, the International Law 
Association and the International Bar Association, have also endorsed the restrictive 
theory.”). 
 135. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. A15 II:A & II:B, 
Award No. 529-A15-FT, 28 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 112, 1992 WL 928957, * § B 
(May 6, 1992). 
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A. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY EXCEPTION SHOULD HAVE A BROAD 
APPLICATION AND SHOULD ESTABLISH JURISDICTION  
IN NAZI ART CONFISCATION CASES 
Courts should establish jurisdiction in Nazi art confiscation cases 
because they are of a decidedly commercial nature and have a direct 
effect in the United States, as the above cases indicate.  Beg, Garb and 
Haven held expropriation to be a sovereign power, as it is generally 
conducted by the government as the type of action in which a private 
party would normally not be able to engage.  However, the above cases 
involved real property and thus are distinguishable from artwork, which 
does not fall under an eminent domain analysis.  Unlike Beg, the 
expropriation in Westfield and similar cases is not of real property used 
for military purposes, which only a government can expropriate, or even 
the regulation of the art market.  Rather, such confiscations without 
compensation were part of an integrated policy to deprive Jews of their 
artwork on fabricated grounds. It would appear as if the government was 
just enforcing laws, but the real goal was to raise funds for party 
officials and to build art collections.136
Similar to Siderman, Weltover, Agadu Chasidei, and now Cassirer, 
whether the act is commercial depends on the subsequent disposition of 
the expropriated assets.  In Nazi art-confiscation cases, this 
expropriation analysis focuses on subsequent Nazi treatment of the 
expropriated property, such as Hitler and Goering’s intent to amass their 
own private collections or build museums stocked full of Jewish art.  
Like the Siderman, Weltover, Altmann, and Cassirer plaintiffs, Nazi 
expropriation of art necessarily requires selling converted works on the 
art market through private auction houses and museums, a decidedly 
commercial activity. 
 
Distinct from Siderman, which held that commercial activity 
involved the foreign nation’s management of the expropriated hotel and 
advertisements in the United States, Westfield’s complaint does not 
provide a detailed analysis of the type of activities in which Hitler’s 
regime engaged.  The nature of the governmental act, namely, 
assembling personal art collections and reselling masterpieces to auction 
houses, is the type of private party activity that Congress envisioned 
falling under the exception.137
 
 136. Westfield, 2009 WL 2356554, at *1. 
  As noted by Segni, if it is essential to 
 137. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2005) (“The commercial character of an activity shall be 
460 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
characterize the activity based on motive, then Nazi art confiscation 
cases would fall under the commercial activity exception. 
With respect to the direct effects of the activity in the United States, 
Westfield did not delve into a direct effects analysis.  However, in the 
context of Nazi art-looting cases, unlike Soudavar and Garb, the current 
trend is to use Weltover’s broad treatment of the direct effects prong 
over the Restatement’s “substantial” and “foreseeable” approach.  
Further, unlike Garb and Haven, where the expropriated property was 
real property, Westfield and similar cases fall into a specific niche 
comprising of solely Nazi-looted art.  Similar to Texas Trading, where 
the contract breaches took place in part outside the United States, in 
Westfield the assets intended for transfer to the United States did not 
reach the United States.  Under a broad construction of the direct effects 
prong, this expropriation robbed Westfield’s family members of the 
benefit of the property.  On a global scale, American citizens and the art 
market were deprived of the cultural benefit and enjoyment of these 
artworks, which would have been made available to American auction 
houses, private, and public institutions. 
In turning to the Tribunal’s findings on FSIA as persuasive 
authority, courts can rely on the fact that the Tribunal more likely than 
not will establish jurisdiction in such cases, as they expounded a 
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.  Although in Foremost the 
Tribunal first used the substantial and foreseeable effects Restatement 
test to find jurisdiction, the Tribunal later took Weltover into account 
and still found that the relaxed standard established the requisite direct 
effect nexus with the forum state to establish jurisdiction.  Similar to 
Foremost, because of its explicit adoption of Weltover’s nature over 
purpose test, Westfield advocated for a broad reading of commercial 
activity.  The same broad reading was adopted by Cassirer, where most 
activities, regardless of whether they turned a profit, were deemed 
 
determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction 
or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.”); see also Malewicz v. City of 
Amsterdam, 362 F. Supp. 2d 298, 313 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that an exhibition loan 
was not a “commercial activity” because “[the activity was] one in which a private 
person could engage,” and that even if the loan were made “purely for educational and 
cultural purposes . . . it still would be ‘commercial activity’ under FSIA”).  See 
generally Washington Conference Proceedings, supra note 30 (establishing the 
Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets, which conducted research on 
the fate of Holocaust-era assets). 
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“commercial.” Examples of these activities included: borrowing art 
works from American museums; encouraging United States residents to 
visit the museum and accepting entrance fees from them; selling various 
items to United States citizens including images of the painting; and 
maintaining a web site where United States citizens may buy admission 
tickets using United States credit cards to view the paintings on 
display.138
In Nazi art expropriation cases, courts should rely on the reasoning 
behind these holdings, which follow the theory of restrictive immunity 
the Tribunal espoused in Iran v. United States.  The Tribunals’ reliance 
on United Nations articles and various other jurisdictions provide courts 
with a rich variety of sources to bolster establishing jurisdiction in Nazi 
art cases. 
 Therefore, like Westfield, under this approach the commercial 
transactions had “substantial contact” with the United States. 
B. LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND FSIA VOUCHES  
A RESTRICTIVE THEORY OF IMMUNITY 
Foreign sovereign immunity, both under the common law and now 
under FSIA, has always been a matter of grace and comity rather than a 
matter of right under United States law.139  Although FSIA protects 
foreign states from harassing litigation that could interfere with their 
governmental functions, such an interest must be balanced against those 
of private individuals who have a right to have their claims against 
foreign states adjudicated equitably.140
As a result, Congress did not intend for FSIA to be construed 
narrowly.  This intent can be inferred from the Supreme Court’s 
retroactive application of FSIA.
 
141
 
 138. Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1023-24. 
  Because this holding ran counter to 
the “Anti Retroactivity Doctrine,” which holds that courts should not 
construe a statute to apply retroactively unless there is a clear statutory 
 139. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983). 
 140. See Virtual Def. & Intelligence Int’l, Inc. v. Republic of Moldova, 133 F. Supp. 
2d 9 (D.D.C. Circ. 1999) (“[i]t is necessary to balance a judiciary’s interest in hearing a 
case involving a commercial activity with the desire to avoid matters of foreign affairs 
controlled by the executive or legislative branches. . . . [When] balancing these 
interests, a court should be mindful that the decision to deny judicial relief to a party 
should not be made lightly.”). 
 141. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004). 
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intent that it would do so, Altmann highlighted the significance of 
FSIA’s immunity provision as restrictive.142 Altmann even emphasized 
the distinction between FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, reiterating 
that FSIA “in no way affects application of the Act of State Doctrine,” 
which requires a substantive determination.143  Intent for a restrictive 
theory of immunity is also evidenced from the fact that there is no 
automatic grant of sovereign immunity to a foreign government that is 
sued in the United States, as FSIA exceptions are varied and broad 
enough to encompass almost any connection to, or activity in, the United 
States.144  For example, the immunity defense is waived when a 
sovereign files a responsive pleading without raising the defense.145  
Similarly, because the legislature intended the commercial activity 
exception to redress grievances, the exception is broad in its 
jurisdictional sweep.146
C. PUBLIC POLICY IN FAVOR OF  
ESTABLISHING JURISDICTION UNDER FSIA 
 
In light of not only recent case law, but also conferences and 
discussions the United States has engaged in regarding restitution, the 
time is ripe for restricting the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Nazi 
art-looting cases, through use of the commercial activity exception.  
Because repatriation is a concrete goal of the United States government, 
preventing the merits of a case like Westfield from being heard under the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity would contradict foreign policy 
concerns.147
Aside from the persuasive precedent of the Tribunal and circuit 
case law in favor of establishing jurisdiction, there is a moral argument 
 
 
 142. Id. at 715. 
 143. Id. at 701. 
 144. Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 362 F. Supp. 2d 298, 308 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 145. See Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 377 (7th Cir. 
1985) (per curiam). 
 146. See Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1113 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982) (“[A]lthough in enacting the commercial activity exception of the jurisdictional 
immunity provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Congress intended to 
parallel the typical state long-arm statute, it also clearly intended certain provisions of 
the commercial activity exception to be broader in their jurisdictional sweep than their 
counterparts in the state-law model.”). 
 147. Schwallie, supra note 55, at 303. 
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in favor of establishing jurisdiction in Westfield and similar cases.  One 
of the major unexpressed reasons why the Supreme Court granted 
jurisdiction in Altmann was for the possibility to reopen this case in 
federal court, and thus preclude any res judicata effects, lest Austria 
retain the paintings that Nazi agents stole from the plaintiff’s family.148  
The victim should not have to unjustly bear the costs of Nazi atrocities 
through lack of an effective forum to adjudicate his or her claims, 
especially since the commercial activities exception “is flexible enough 
to allow for this course without undermining the statutory framework for 
predictable adjudication of sovereign immunity.”149
It is in the interests of public policy to address victims’ claims and 
resolve Holocaust Era cases, especially given American efforts to rectify 
the havoc wreaked by Hitler’s regime after World War II.  Removing 
the jurisdictional bar will require shifting the framework of analysis 
from a focus on the nature of the government action to the nature of the 
use of property, looking at all persuasive authority on FSIA.  Through 
the joint efforts of the legislature and the judiciary, these actions will 
bring the United States one step closer towards resolving Nazi-art 
expropriation claims through proper jurisdictional means. 
 
 
 
 148. Svetlana Shirinova, Challenges To Establishing Jurisdiction Over Holocaust 
Era Claims In Federal Court, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 159, 189 (2004). 
 149. Leung, supra note 36, at 735-36. 
